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WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD USE ARIOSA V. SEQUENOM
TO PROVIDE FURTHER GUIDANCE ON 35 U.S.C. § 101 PATENT
ELIGIBILITY
NAIRA REZENDE SIMMONS1
ABSTRACT
35 U.S.C. § 101 provides patent protection to “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof.” The Supreme Court previously concluded
that Congress intended patentable subject matter to “include anything
under the sun that is made by man.”2 Nevertheless, over the past five years
the U.S. Supreme Court has made a series of decisions that narrowed the
scope of subject matter eligible for patent protection.
In Mayo3 the court held that correlations between the concentrations
of a metabolite in the blood and the concentration of a drug are not patent
eligible because such correlations are “laws of nature.” In Alice 4 the
Court not only limited the patent eligibility of computer-implemented
methods and systems, but it articulated that the “Mayo framework” should
be used in all cases in which the Court had to decide whether some
category of technological innovation was inside or outside the scope of the
patent system.
As a result of the overly broad, sweeping decisions made by the
Supreme Court over the past five years, many important inventions that
otherwise satisfy all statutory requirements for patent eligibility are no
longer receiving proper patent protection. This paper discusses the context
and implications of the holdings of Chakrabarty 5, Diehr6, Bilski7, Mayo8,
1. J.D. Candidate at the University of California Hastings College of the Law. I am grateful to
professor Robin Feldman for her comments and guidance. Any mistakes or omissions are mine alone.
2. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that genetically modified
organisms can be patented).
3. See generally Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
4. See generally Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
5. See generally Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303.
6. See generally Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
7. See generally Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
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Myriad9, and Alice10, and it uses the facts and posture of Ariosa11 to
illustrate that patent protection is being denied to remarkable inventions
based on the newly created judicial exceptions to patent eligibility.
This paper concludes by proposing that since judicial decisions rely
on the facts which led to the dispute, judicially created exceptions to 35
U.S.C. § 101 should be narrowly applied to one or more classes in the
Cooperative Patent Classification System (CPC). Because patents in the
same class have similar technical features, the application of a judicial
exception to patents in the same or similar classes would limit the
possibility of unanticipated consequences for inventions in various fields
that fall under the broad application of exceptions based on specific facts.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. OVERVIEW ............................................................................................ 114
A. The Constitutional Foundation for Patent Eligible Subject
Matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. ............................................... 114
B. Issues Raised by the Application of 35 U.S.C. § 101 to New
Technologies .......................................................................... 116
II. ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................ 118
C. Existing Judicial Framework Limiting the Scope of Patent
Eligible Subject Matter .......................................................... 118
D. The Facts and Posture of Ariosa v. Sequenom ......................... 129
III. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 132
E. The Supreme Court should use the facts and posture of
Ariosa v. Sequenom to provide further guidance on patent
eligibility and perhaps limit the scope of judicially created
exceptions to patent eligibility to select classes of patents. .... 132

8.
9.
10.
11.

See generally Mayo 132 S. Ct. 1289.
See generally Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
See generally Alice Corp. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
See generally Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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I. OVERVIEW
A. The Constitutional Foundation for Patent Eligible Subject Matter under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
For four months during the summer of 1787, the Constitutional
Convention met “in order to form a more perfect union” 12 through the
creation of the Constitution. One of the specific powers discussed and
addressed was the governance of intellectual property in a national
economy. The framers knew that society benefits from products of original
and creative thought, and they included a legal framework for providing
incentives to inventors and authors in the Constitution. Even during the
Convention, while drafting the most important document ever written in the
United States, the delegates adjourned one afternoon to watch an inventor
named John Fitch demonstrate a trial of one of his inventions: a 45-foot
steamboat on the Delaware River. 13 As Abraham Lincoln once said, “[t]he
Patent System added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius.” 14
The United States Constitution, on which U.S. Patent Law depends,
was drafted in a pro-patent climate. Thomas Jefferson was directly
involved in the patent system and drafted the statutory definition of what
constitutes a patentable invention. In the Patent Act of 1793, Jefferson
defined a patentable invention as “any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement
thereof.”15 Subsequent patent statutes in 1836, 1870, and 1874 employed
the same broad language. In 1952, when the patent laws were recodified,
Congress replaced the word ‘art’ with ‘process,’ but otherwise left
Jefferson’s language intact. The Committee Reports accompanying the
1952 act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to
“include anything under the sun that is made by man, but it is not
necessarily patentable under section 101 unless the conditions of the title
are fulfilled.”16 The America Invents Act of 201117, a law that represents

12. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
13. John Fitch Was Granted a U.S Patent for the Steamboat, America’s Story from America’s
Library, AMERICA’S LIBRARY, http://www.americaslibrary.gov/jb/nation/jb_nation_fitch_1.html
(discussing the grant of the U.S. patent for the steamboat in 1791) (last visited Apr. 21, 2016).
14. George F. Will, Rev the scientific engine, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 2, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/31/AR2010123102007.html
(Lincoln’s quote is reportedly from a speech in Jacksonville, Illinois, delivered in February of 1859).
15. Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-23 (Feb. 21, 1793).
16. S. Rep. No. 1979, at 4 (1952); reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399. (The conditions of
the title include also satisfying 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112) 16. S. Rep.
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the most significant change to the U.S. patent system since 1952, did not
change the statutory definition of what constitutes patentable inventions.
As of today, the patent statute still provides that:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title.18

The text of the statute still reflects the language drafted by Jefferson.
However, the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101 has been severely curtailed by
the United States Supreme Court, most notably in a quartet of
contemporaneous cases - Bilski19, Mayo20, Myriad21, and Alice.22
It is possible, or even likely, that the decisions of our highest court –
which have significantly narrowed the statutory definition of patent eligible
subject matter – are a direct response to the failure of the patent system to
properly address ethical, moral, socio-economic as well as inventiveness
and obviousness issues raised by the emergence of new technologies. 23 For
instance, many acknowledge that flaws in the patent system contributed to
the rise of non-practicing entities (NPEs)24, and that NPEs in turn have
wreaked economic havoc in many industries by enforcing weak or
otherwise invalid patents.25 Nonetheless, the broad application of the newly

17. See generally LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT, PUB.L. No. 112–29,125 Stat. 284
(2011).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 101 INVENTIONS PATENTABLE.
19. See generally Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
20. See generally Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
21. See generally Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
22. See generally Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
23. Software, computers, or genetically engineered organisms, are not explicitly mentioned in
statutory United States patent law. For an insightful analysis of some of issues raised by the failure of
the patent system to properly address new technologies, see U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO13-465, Intellectual Property: Assessing Factors That Affect Patent Infringement Litigation Could Help
Improve Patent Quality (2013) (Congress required the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to
study the consequences of patent litigation by NPEs or patent assertion entities (PAEs) in consultation
with the USPTO. This study included the volume of litigation in the 20 years before enactment of the
AIA, the volume of cases which are found to be without merit after judicial review, the impact of
litigation on the time to resolve patent claims, the costs of such litigation, its economic impact on the
U.S. economy and job creation, and any benefits created by NPEs or PAEs.).
24. James Bessen, Jennifer Ford & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of Patent
Trolls 2 1-33 (Boston Univ. School of Law, Working Paper No. 11-45, 2011) (raising the question: “Or
are they “patent trolls” who exploit weaknesses in the patent system?”); accord, see generally Kirby
Ferguson, The Rise of the Patent Troll: An Animated Primer by Kirby Ferguson, OPEN CULTURE (Apr.
14, 2014), http://www.openculture.com/2014/04/the-rise-of-the-patent-troll.html. Accord Sara Jeruss,
Robin Feldman, Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities
on Us Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 357-89 (2012).
25. See generally Chris Barry, Ronen Arad, Landan Ansell, Meredith Cartier, and HyeYun Lee,
2015 Patent Litigation Study: A Change in Patentee Fortunes, PWC (May 2015),
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created exceptions to patentability has damaged many innovators.
Particularly, the recent decisions in Myriad and Alice, have provoked
uncertainty in entire industries. In numerous cases, the current approach to
what is patent eligible “seems to lead to the reduction ad absurdum that
most biotechnology processes are patent-ineligible.”26
This paper first considers the historical context of select judicial
opinions interpreting the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101, including
Chakrabarty27 and Diehr28 Thereafter, this paper considers the implications
of the judicial framework created by the United States Supreme Court in
the quartet of cases that outlined the current rules: Bilski29, Mayo30,
Myriad31, and Alice32 This paper uses the facts and posture of Ariosa v.
Sequenom33 to illustrate the shortcomings of this broad framework. In
doing so, it provides a practical, simple, readily applicable approach for
applying the law to the facts, based on a patent classification system that
could produce results which are more consistent with the purpose of patent
law: to promote the progress of science and useful arts.
B. Issues Raised by the Application of 35 U.S.C. § 101 to New
Technologies
Throughout the existence of the patent system patents were, for the
most part, seen by industry as shields to protect inventions from
competition by “free riders” who simply copied such inventions. The broad
language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 justified and protected the ideas and efforts of
innovators in developing and improving “anything under the sun” 34, as long

https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2015-pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf.
Accord David L. Schwartz, Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent
System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 425-50 (2014).
26. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Ariosa v. Sequenom and the Path Ahead for Subject-Matter Eligibility,
Patently-O, PATENTLYO (June 14, 2015), patentlyo.com/patent/2015/06/sequenom-subjecteligibility.html. Accord Brief of Professors Jeffrey A. Lefstin and Peter S. Menell as Amici Curiae, at 1,
Ariosa v. Sequenom, 788 F.3d 1271 (2015) (No. 2014–1139, 2014–1144).
27. See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
28. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
29. Bilski ,v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
30. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
31. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
32. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
33. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g denied, 809
F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
34. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399 (the full
quote suggests that the other conditions of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 112 need to be satisfied as well. It
recites: “A person may have “invented” a machine or a manufacture, which may include anything under
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as it satisfied all conditions for patentability. Throughout history, patents
have also been used as “swords”, a term that refers to the offensive use of
patent portfolios against a third-party.35 Beginning in the early 2000s the
practice of using patents as “swords” gained momentum.
A major trigger for this shift was the economic slowdown of 2001,
while some industries recovered quickly and reached new heights in
employment by 200836 (e.g., most high-tech industries in the Silicon Valley
grew more concentrated in the local economy relative to the United States
from 2001 to 2008)37 many companies that had developed intellectual
property became bankrupt and their intellectual property was acquired by
third parties looking for means to obtain a return on their investment.
Frequently, NPEs were not actually involved in producing or marketing
products themselves, so the most natural way to recover the investment was
by licensing the intellectual property they had acquired or by suing for
intellectual property infringement.
In due course, the successes and large recoveries obtained in
infringement suits motivated some entities to acquire intellectual property
solely for the purpose of enforcing it against third-parties.38 Currently, the
failure of a practitioner to advise a client to develop a patent portfolio that
can be used both offensively and defensively could arguably be considered
malpractice. The full impact of practicing patent owners and NPEs39 using
their patents as swords rather than shields has attracted the attention of the
President’s Council of Economic Advisers, the National Economic
Council, the Office of Science & Technology Policy, Scholars 40 and the

the sun that is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101 unless the conditions
of the title are fulfilled”).
35. See, e.g., Rajiv Patel, Developing a Patent Strategy: A Checklist for Getting Started, FENWICK
& WEST LLP, https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/Patent_Checklist.pdf (succinctly outlines
that a patent strategy should consider whether a patent portfolio is to be used offensively, defensively,
or in a another form).
36. See, Amar Mann & Tony Nunes, After the Dot-Com Bubble: Silicon Valley High-Tech
Employment and Wages in 2001 and 2008, Office of Publications & Special Studies, Regional Report,
BUREAU
OF
LABOR
STATISTICS
(August
2009),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/regional_reports/200908_silicon_valley_high_tech.htm.
37. Id.
38. See,
e.g.,
Patent
Troll,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUNDATION,
https://www.eff.org/issues/resources-patent-troll-victims (last visited Sept. 17, 2016) (Noting that the
patent troll problem is not a new one, however they have created a troubling new trend where more and
more small developers and companies are targeted by trolls).
39. NPEs are also known in the literature as patent monetization entities.
40. Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent
Monetization Entities on Us Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 360 (2012), See also, Robin
Feldman, Patent Demands & Startup Companies: The View from the Venture Capital Community, 16
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Supreme Court of the United States.41 Many believe that some of the
limitations on patent eligible subject matter by the Supreme Court are a
reaction to patent monetization.42
II. ARGUMENTS
C. Existing Judicial Framework Limiting the Scope of Patent Eligible
Subject Matter
Judicial opinions, by their very nature are – or should be – fact
specific. To better understand the current judicial framework limiting the
scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101, one should consider how the courts have
answered ethical, moral, economic, and technical challenges to the statute.
In modern times, the most difficult biotechnology question before the
Supreme Court was presented in a case dealing with whether genetically
modified living organisms are patent eligible.43 The facts of Chakrabarty
are simple: while working for General Electric, a genetic engineer
developed a bacterium that had the ability to break down crude oil. General
Electric filed a U.S. patent application for the bacterium, listing
Chakrabarty as the inventor and proposing to use the engineered bacterium
in cleaning oil spills. The application was rejected by a patent examiner,
who argued that living things were not patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C § 101.44

YALE J.L. & TECH. 236, 239 (2014) (Examining the effects of the rising patent monetization market on
startup companies).
41. The United States Supreme Court has attempted to impose direct barriers on litigation driven
by patent monetization entities when it lowered the bar for a defendant to recover its legal costs if the
judge sees the plaintiff’s suit as frivolous. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 1749, 1757-58 (2014).
42. James Bessen, What the Courts Did to Curb Patent Trolling—for Now, THE ATLANTIC (Dec.
1, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/12/what-the-courts-did-to-curb-patenttrollingfor-now/383138/ (Arguing that the number of lawsuits has been declining since the Supreme
Court decision in Alice).
43. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 303-07 (1980). Cf., In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh),
750 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (The second most difficult biotechnology question considered by the
Supreme Court). In Roslin, the institute was the first group to successfully produce the first mammal
ever cloned from an adult somatic cell: Dolly the Sheep. In the opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed a
determination by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board affirming the rejection of claims 155-159 and 164
of U.S. Application No. 09/225,233 (filed Apr. 4, 1999) as being directed to unpatentable subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
44. See generally, prosecution history of U.S. Patent No. 4,259,444 (issued Mar. 31, 1981).
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Two former administrative bodies within the USPTO came to opposite
conclusions with regards to the patent eligibility of living organisms 45, and
this compelled the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks to seek
guidance from the Supreme Court on the interpretation of 35 U.S.C §
101.46 Chief Justice Warren Burger delivered a split 5-4 ruling in favor of
General Electric. 47 In his opinion, Chief Justice Burger noted that:
The question before us in this case is a narrow one of statutory interpretation
requiring us to construe 35 U.S.C. § 101, which provides: “Whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” Specifically,
we must determine whether respondent’s micro-organism constitutes a
“manufacture” or “composition of matter” within the meaning of the statute.48

Chief Justice Burger concluded that an engineered bacterium was
eligible for patent protection under the statute. In reaching that conclusion,
the Chief Justice reminded everyone that the statute was authored by
Thomas Jefferson and embodied Jefferson’s philosophy that “ingenuity
should receive a liberal encouragement.”49 Furthermore, the Chief Justice
noted that subsequent patent statutes enacted in 1836, 1870, and 1874
“employed the same broad language”, and that the recodification of the
statute in 1952 by Congress merely replaced the word “art” with “process.”
Chakrabarty was consistent with decades of legal practice, but shortly
thereafter the Supreme Court became more active in questioning the
breadth of 35 U.S.C. § 101.50 The patents that concerned the Supreme
45. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). The Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences (BPAI) agreed with the original decision; however, the United States Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (CCPA) overturned the case in Chakrabarty’s favor, writing that “the fact that
micro-organisms are alive is without legal significance for purposes of the patent law.” The BPAI has
since been replaced with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) and the CCPA ceased to exist in
1982.
46. See generally, prosecution history of U.S. Patent No. 4,259,444 (issued Mar. 31, 1981).
47. See generally Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote the decision,
and was joined by Potter Stewart, Harry Blackmun, William Rehnquist, and John Paul Stevens. The
dissenting opinion was written by William J. Brennan, who was joined by Byron White, Thurgood
Marshall, and Lewis Franklin Powell.
48. Id. at 307 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 308.
50. The original trilogy of patent cases by the Supreme Court discussing the patent eligibility of
computer software related invention elaborated on the theory of preemption. In Gottschalk v. Benson
409 U.S. 63 (1972) the Court ruled that a process claim directed to a numerical algorithm, as such, was
not patentable because “the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula.” In Parker v,
Flook. 437 U.S. 584 (1978) the Court ruled that an invention that departs from the prior art only in its
use of a mathematical formula is patent-eligible only if the implementation is novel and nonobvious.
The algorithm itself must be considered as if it were part of the prior art. In Alice, the current
controlling opinion, the court elaborates that the risk of preemption must be “disproportionate.” Alice,
slip op. at 5.
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Court the most were patents related to laws of nature51 and abstract ideas.52
In Diamond v. Diehr, the Supreme Court outlined a third exception to
patent eligible subject matter: natural phenomena. Diehr53 forced the
justices to consider the application of their own precedents, which notably
discussed the possibility of preemption by a broad reading of 35 U.S.C. §
101 to advances in computer technology. 54 The patent at stake in Diehr
disclosed an invention that provided improvements to the process of curing
synthetic rubber.55 The improvements incorporated the use of embedded
thermocouples into existing machinery to constantly monitor temperatures
inside a pressing mold.56 The embedded thermocouples fed the measured
values into a computer and used a well-known mathematical equation to
calculate when the molding process should be finished. 57
Individually, the components of the Diehr patent were entirely known
in either the rubber industry or technology circles. 58 As a whole, the
invention improved the efficiency of the process and the quality of the
product, and the significance of the improvements and value of the
invention were not disputed by any court. 59 To acknowledge the

51. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
52. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
53. Diehr produced another 5-4 split opinion by the Supreme Court. The majority wrote an
opinion by Rehnquist, joined by Burger, Stewart, White, Powell. Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting
opinion joined by Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun.
54. For discussion of preemption in dicta, see the two original cases in the software patent
eligibility trilogy: (1) Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (explaining that that holding the patent
at issue as valid “would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a
patent on the algorithm itself”); and (2) Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (holding that the claims
involved statutory subject matter because they included recitation of post-solution activity and did not
preempt the formula or algorithm used). The adjective “disproportionate” was recently added by the
Courts in Alice.
55. The claimed invention was a process for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured
precision products. The process uses a mold for precisely shaping the uncured material under heat and
pressure and then curing the synthetic rubber in the mold so that the product will retain its shape and be
functionally operative after the molding is completed. Before the invention was made, there was no
disclosed way to improve the measure of the temperature without opening the press. The invention
solved this problem by using embedded thermocouples to constantly check the temperature, and then
feeding the measured values into a computer. The computer then used the Arrhenius equation to
calculate when sufficient energy had been absorbed so that the molding machine should open the press.
56. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177-78 (1981).
57. Id.
58. Basics of rubber curation have been published as early as the 1900’s, see, e.g., Rubber, (Peeps
at industries) by Edith A. Browne, London: A&C Black, 1912. The Arrhenius equation was first
published by Arrhenius in 1889, see generally, Arrhenius, S.A. (1889). “Über die Dissociationswärme
und den Einflusß der Temperatur auf den Dissociationsgrad der Elektrolyte.” Z. Phys. Chem. 4: 96–
116.
59. Diehr, 447 U.S. 303 at 179 (1981). Noting that “[r]espondents characterize their contribution
to the art to reside in the process of constantly measuring the actual temperature inside the mold.”
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significance of the discovery in its totality the Supreme Court explained
that patent claims have to be considered as a whole. In the words of Justice
Rehnquist:
When a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies that
formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is
performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g.,
transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim
satisfies the requirements of § 101.”60

Reading the claims as a whole provided an effective way for the
Supreme Court to address concerns of preemption by broad patents while
acknowledging the innovative contributions of an invention to a particular
technical field.61 Diehr outlined a logical path for claim construction under
35 U.S.C. § 101, but subsequent cases have limited the meaning of the
statute.
Shortly after Diehr was decided, Congress passed the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982. 62 The Act which merged the United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the appellate division of the
United States Court of Claims, making the judges of the former courts into
circuit court judges.63 The goal of the creation of the Federal Circuit was to
promote greater uniformity in certain areas of federal jurisdiction, i.e.
patent law, and relieve the pressure on the dockets of the Supreme Court
and the courts of appeals for the regional circuits. 64 The Federal Circuit is
particularly known for its decisions on patent law, as it is the only
appellate-level court with the jurisdiction to hear patent case appeals. 65 The
Federal Circuit attempted to apply some of the patent eligibility tests
previously articulated by the Supreme Court, and it also created some of its
own tests. However, all of these tests were created to address specific
questions arising in particular fact-patterns and they have proven difficult
to apply in even slightly different scenarios across various areas of
Further noting that “[t]he patent examiner rejected the respondents’ claims on the sole ground that they
were drawn to nonstatutory subject matter under 35 U. S. C. § 101.”
60. Id. at 175, 192.
61. Under a legal theory of preemption, “a mathematical formula, like a law of nature, cannot be
the subject of a patent, cf. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584.” See
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (holding that a process claim directed to a numerical
algorithm, as such, was not patentable because “the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical
formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”).”
62. Landmark Judicial Legislation, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL
CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_22.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2016).
63. PUB.L. 97–164 §165, 96 Stat. 50. Public Law 97-164, § 165 (1982) (enacted).
64. See, Landmark Judicial Legislation, supra note 62.
65. Roger Meiners, Al H. Ringleb, & Frances L. Edwards, THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF
BUSINESS Chapter 12. (12th ed. 2016).
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technology. A notable example is the disparate interpretation of the
“machine-or-transformation”66 test of patent eligibility by different judges
within the Federal Circuit and within the Supreme Court seen in Bilski v.
Kappos.67 Bilski is a case about the patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of
an abstract idea: a method of hedging risk in the field of commodities
trading in the energy market.68 In Bilski, The Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court all concluded that
the claims were invalid, but they did so using irreconcilable legal reasoning
and different interpretations of the machine-or-transformation test.
In delivering the majority opinion in Bilski69, Justice Kennedy framed
the legal question as one of statutory interpretation pertaining to the breadth
of 35 U.S.C. § 101.70 He noted that the Federal Circuit “produced five

66. The “machine-or-transformation” test was first articulated under its present form in the
government’s brief in Gottschalk.
67. See A. Mark Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2011).
(discussing Bilski, the machine-or-transformation test, and concerns with patentability of “natural
laws”).
68. The first claim consists of the following steps: “(:”(a) initiating a series of transactions
between said commodity provider and consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase
said commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk
position of said consumers;” (;”(b) “identifying market participants for said commodity having a
counter-risk position to said consumers;”; and “(c) initiating a series of transactions between said
commodity provider and said market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of market
participant transactions balances the risk position of said series of consumer transactions.” In Bilski,
The patent examiner rejected the application on the grounds that the invention is not implemented on a
specific apparatus, merely manipulates an abstract idea, and solves a purely mathematical problem. The
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences agreed and affirmed. The Federal Circuit, in turn, affirmed.
The en banc court rejected its prior test for determining whether a claimed invention was a patentable
“process” under Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101—i.e., whether the invention produced a “useful, concrete,
and tangible result,” see, e.g., State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149
F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998)——holding instead that a claimed process is patent eligible if: (1) it is
tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or
thing. Concluding that this “machine-or-transformation test” is the sole test for determining patent
eligibility of a “process” under § 101, the [Federal Circuit] applied the test and held that the application
was not patent eligible. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). The Supreme Court affirmed the
holding, but clarified the machine-or-transformation test was an important clue, but not the only test.
69. In Bilski, Kennedy delivered the majority opinion, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito; Scalia
(except Parts II-B-2 and II-C-2). A concurrence was written by Justice Stevens, joined by Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor. A separate concurrence was written by Justice Breyer, joined by Scalia (Part II).
70. Justice Kennedy reiterated the dicta of Chakrabarty noting that “Congress plainly
contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope” and summarized what the Supreme
Court considers to be the three specific exceptions of patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §
101. In justice Kennedy’s words: “This Court’s precedents provide three specific exceptions to § 101’s
broad principles: “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.” “While not required by the
statutory text, these exceptions are consistent with the notion that a patentable process must be new and
useful.” And, in any case, the exceptions have defined the statute’s reach as a matter of statutory stare
decisis going back 150 years. See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1853). The § 101 eligibility inquiry
is only a threshold test. Even if a claimed invention qualifies in one of the four categories, it must also
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different opinions” in interpreting the machine-or-transformation test and
that “students of patent law would be well advised to study these scholarly
opinions.”71 With regards to the different opinions produced by the Federal
Circuit, Justice Kennedy highlights that different justices would have used
distinct rationales for finding the Bilski claim invalid under 35 U.S.C. §
10172 and “[o]nly Judge Newman disagreed with the court’s conclusion that
petitioners’ application was outside of the reach of § 101.”73 “She did not
say that the application should have been granted but only that the issue
should be remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the
application qualified as patentable under other provisions.”74 Specifically,
Justice Kennedy articulates that the entire Federal Circuit erred in their
interpretation of the machine-or-transformation test. In Justice Kennedy’s
words:
Three arguments are advanced for the proposition that the [Bilski] invention is
outside the scope of patent law: (1) it is not tied to a machine and does not
transform an article; (2) it involves a method of conducting business; and (3) it
is merely an abstract idea. The Court of Appeals ruled that the first mentioned
of these, the so-called machine-or-transformation test, was the sole test to be
used for determining the patentability of a “process” under the Patent Act, 35
U.S.C. § 101 . . . . Adopting the machine-or-transformation test as the sole test
for what constitutes a “process” (as opposed to just an important and useful
clue) violates these statutory interpretation principles.75

After Bilski, we started to see many examples of the difficulties
presented by the broad application of specific judicial exceptions to new,
non-analogous art. Mayo is a good example of a case where the USPTO,
the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court arrived at entirely disparate
results.76,77 Many agree that the Mayo claims captured an important
satisfy “the conditions and requirements of this title, § 101(a), including novelty, see § 102,
nonobviousness, see § 103, and a full and particular description, see § 112.”
71. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 600 (2010).
72. Judge Mayer argued that petitioners’ application was “not eligible for patent protection
because it is directed to a method of conducting business.” In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir.
2008). He urged the adoption of a “technological standard for patentability.” Id. at 1010. Judge Rader
would have found petitioners’ claims were an unpatentable abstract idea. Id. at 1011. Bilski v. Kappos,
561 U.S. 593, 600-01 (2010).)
73. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 597-98 (emphasis added).
76. Petitioners Mayo Collaborative Services and Mayo Clinic Rochester (Mayo) bought and used
diagnostic tests based on Prometheus’ patents. But in 2004 Mayo announced that it intended to sell and
market its own, somewhat different, diagnostic test. Prometheus sued Mayo contending that Mayo’s test
infringed its patents. The District Court found that the test infringed the patents but granted summary
judgment to Mayo, reasoning that the processes claimed by the patents effectively claim natural laws or
natural phenomena—namely, the correlations between thiopurine metabolite levels and the toxicity and
efficacy of thiopurine drugs—and therefore are not patentable. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding the
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discovery that was inventive, non-obvious, and fully described in the patent
specification,78 i.e., it satisfied all statutory requirements for patent
eligibility outside of 35 U.S.C. § 101.79 The invention required
administering a drug to a patient, measuring the level of a metabolite of the
drug in the blood of the patient, and determining whether the level of the
metabolite in the blood is above or below a threshold level associated with
toxicity.80 A significant amount of research and development was
employed by the inventors to determine what constitutes a safe and what
constitutes a toxic level of the metabolite. Interestingly, because every
person metabolizes the drug in a different way, the Mayo invention gave a
physician the required tools to assess how a patient was individually
metabolizing the drug81 This provided invaluable guidance to a physician in
determining what dose of the drug should be prescribed to a patient. This
also allowed a physician to adjust the dose of the drug that is prescribed
depending on individual patient responses82
The patent examiner(s) who issued the Mayo claims had been trained
to recognize inventiveness but was not necessarily exposed to recent
developments in patent law. 83 When the Mayo patent was challenged in
processes to be patent eligible under the Circuit’s “machine or transformation test.” On remand from
the [Supreme Court] for reconsideration in light of Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 177
L.Ed.2d 792, which clarified that the “machine or transformation test” is not a definitive test of patent
eligibility, id. at –, 130 S.Ct. at 3226–3227, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed its earlier conclusion. The
Supreme Court reversed and found that the claims were patent ineligible. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1291 (2012).
77. The sitting justices included Justice Breyer, who delivered the opinion for the majority, Chief
Justice J. Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, Justice Ginsburg, Justice Alito,
Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan.
78. See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Inventive Application: A History, 67 FLA. L. REV. 565 (2015)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s recent cases on patent-eligible subject matter and the inventive
character of Mayo).
79. The exemplary claim of Mayo recites: “A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for
treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising: (a) administering a drug
providing 6–thioguanine to a subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and (b)
determining the level of 6–thioguanine in said subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal
disorder, wherein the level of 6–thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8 x 10 8 red blood cells
indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject and
wherein the level of 6–thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8 x 10 8 red blood cells indicates a
need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject.” U.S. Patent No.
6,355,623, (issued Mar. 12, 2002).
80. See generally, specification of U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 (issued Mar. 12, 2002) and U.S.
Patent No. 6,680,302 (issued Jan. 20, 2004) (describing the use of thiopurine drugs).
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 (issued Mar. 12, 2002) which teaches a
required level of 6-thioguanine that indicates a need to increase the amount of drug being administered
to a subject.
83. Patent Examiners are not required to be lawyers, often, Patent Examiners are engineers and
scientists. For a description of the qualification requirements for a patent examiner position see Patent
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District Court, the court hesitated in interpreting the judicial precedent. 84
The district court judges provided a complete infringement analysis under
the presumption of validity of the issued patent, but they proceed to grant
summary judgment against Mayo, reasoning that the patents effectively
claim natural laws or natural phenomena. 85 On appeal, the Federal Circuit
reversed relying on the machine-or-transformation test that had previously
caused significant controversy in Bilski.86 Partially relying on guidance
from the Supreme Court holding in Bilski, which held that the machine-ortransformation test is “not the only test but an useful clue”, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the Mayo claims required the transformation of the
drug by the human body.87 Perhaps a bit precociously, and without
completing a full analysis, the Federal circuit concluded that the Mayo
patents satisfied the Circuit’s “machine-or-transformation test,” which the
Federal Circuit thought to be sufficient to “confine the patent monopoly
within rather definite bounds.”88
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and overturned the
prior ruling unanimously, and reminded everyone, that the “machine-ortransformation test” is not a definitive test of patent eligibility, but only an
important and useful clue.”89 Yet, somehow, the Federal Circuit understood
that the machine-or-transformation test led to the “clear and compelling
conclusion . . . that the . . . claims . . . do not encompass laws of nature or
preempt natural correlations.”90 Unanimously, the Supreme Court held that
the right question to be asked was “do the patent claims add enough to their
statements of the correlations to allow the processes they describe to
examiner
positions,
U.S.
PAT.
AND
TRADEMARK
OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/exam.htm (last modified Dec. 3, 2016 12:29:34 PM).
84. See generally, Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 2005 WL 7985065 (S.D.
Cal. Nov. 22, 2005).
85. The District Court found that Mayo’s test infringed claim 7 of the ‘623 patent. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 110a–115a. In interpreting the claim, the court accepted Prometheus’ view that the toxicity-risk
level numbers in Mayo’s test and the claim were too similar to render the tests significantly different.
The number Mayo used was too close to the number the claim used to matter given appropriate margins
of error. Nonetheless the District Court ultimately granted summary judgment in Mayo’s favor. The
court reasoned that the patents effectively claim natural laws or natural phenomena—namely the
correlations between thiopurine metabolite levels and the toxicity and efficacy of thiopurine drug
dosages—and so are not patentable. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 2008 WL
878910 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008)
86. See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 561 U.S. 1040.
87. Id. at 1343.
88. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1345-47 (2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
89. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2012).
90. Id.
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qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws?” “We believe
that the answer to this question is no.”91 In answering the aforementioned
question in the negative, the Supreme Court significantly curbed the patent
protection available to diagnostic inventions. This is important because one
of the alternatives to patent protection, keeping a technology a trade secret,
does not provide proper protection to technologies and diagnostic tools that
need to be fully disclosed to the public during the regulatory approval
process.
The Supreme Court outlined another challenge to the validity of
diagnostic patents in Myriad.92 Myriad is an unusual case largely driven by
advocacy organizations. 93 In Myriad, medical organizations, researchers,
genetic counselors, and patients brought action against patentee and the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), challenging the
validity of patents for isolated deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sequences
associated with predisposition to breast cancers and ovarian cancers, and
patents for diagnostic methods of identifying mutations in those DNA
sequences. Myriad had obtained several such patents, covering the
sequence of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. 94 Myriad’s knowledge of the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations typically involved in disease progression
allowed it to reverse engineer the genes’ normal nucleotide sequence and to
develop medical tests useful for detecting mutations in these genes in a
particular patient and for assessing the patient’s cancer risk.95 If valid,
Myriad’s patents would give it the exclusive right to isolate an individual’s
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, and would give Myriad the exclusive right to
synthetically create BRCA cDNA.96 Justice Thomas delivered the opinion

91. Id. at 1297.
92. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
93. See A Lane Baldwin & Robert Cook-Deegan, Constructing narratives of heroism and
villainy: case study of Myriad’s BRACAnalysis® compared to Genentech’s Herceptin®, 5 GENOME
MED. 1 (2013).
94. The patents include U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (issued May 5, 1998); U.S. Patent No.
5,837,492 (issued Nov. 17, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 (issued Dec. 2, 1997); U.S. Patent No.
5,709,999(issued Jan. 20, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,710,001 (issued Jan. 20, 1998); U.S. Patent No.
5,753,441 (issued May 19, 1998); and U.S. Patent No. 6,033,857 (Mar. 7, 2000).
95. See generally, specifications and claims of U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (issued May 5, 1998);
U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492 (issued Nov. 17, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 (issued Dec. 2, 1997);
U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999 (issued Jan. 20, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,710,001 (issued Jan. 20, 1998);
U.S. Patent No. 5,753,441 (issued May 19, 1998); and U.S. Patent No. 6,033,857 (issued Mar. 7, 2000).
96. See claims of U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (issued May 5, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492
(issued Nov. 17, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 (issued Dec. 1997); U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999
(issued Jan. 20, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,710,001 (issued Jan. 20, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,753,441
(issued May 19, 1998); and U.S. Patent No. 6,033,857 (issued Mar. 7 2000).
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of the court in Myriad97, which partially reiterated the previous Supreme
Court analysis of patent eligible subject matter in Mayo, but introduced
new limitations to patent eligibility of natural products. The opinion did not
deny the magnitude of Myriad’s discoveries, but surprisingly Justice
Thomas indicated that “[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant
discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.”98 This statement is
contrary to the very purpose of 35 U.S.C. § 101 to provide protection to
“any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” It is also contrary to
what Thomas Jefferson intended to protect when he drafted the statute
describing patent eligible subject matter.99
To decide Myriad, the majority of the Supreme Court parsed the
genetic code of the BRAC1 and BRAC2 genes into components that were
“naturally occurring” versus components that were not “naturally
occurring.”100 In doing so, it concluded that the sequences of BRAC1 and
BRAC2 genes were not patent eligible because they were products of
nature.101 However, the synthetic intermediate used in an in-vitro reaction
to amplify BRAC1 and BRAC2, namely the complementary DNA (cDNA)

97. Thomas, Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined the
majority opinion. Scalia joined in part and filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2110 (2013).
98. Id. at 2117. To support that reasoning, Justice Thomas evoked the line of reasoning discussed
in a much older Supreme Court Case: “In Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127,
68 S.Ct. 440, 92 L.Ed. 588 (1948), this Court considered a composition patent that claimed a mixture of
naturally occurring strains of bacteria that helped leguminous plants take nitrogen from the air and fix it
in the soil. Id., at 128–129, 68 S.Ct. 440. The ability of the bacteria to fix nitrogen was well known, and
farmers commonly “inoculated” their crops with them to improve soil nitrogen levels. But farmers
could not use the same inoculant for all crops, both because plants use different bacteria and because
certain bacteria inhibit each other. Id., at 129–130, 68 S.Ct. 440. Upon learning that several nitrogenfixing bacteria did not inhibit each other, however, the patent applicant combined them into a single
inoculant and obtained a patent. Id., at 130, 68 S.Ct. 440. The Court held that the composition was not
patent eligible because the patent holder did not alter the bacteria in any way. Id., at 132, 68 S.Ct.
440 (“There is no way in which we could call [the bacteria mixture a product of invention] unless we
borrowed invention from the discovery of the natural principle itself”). His patent claim thus fell
squarely within the law of nature exception. So do Myriad’s. Myriad found the location of the BRCA1
and BRCA2 genes, but that discovery, by itself, does not render the BRCA genes “new . . .
composition[s] of matter,” § 101, that are patent eligible.” Id.
99. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 28 August 1789, in PTJ, 15:368.
Transcription available at Founders Online. Jefferson articulates his intention of providing protection
for monopolies by stating: “monopolies may be allowed to persons for their own productions in
literature
and
their
own
inventions
in
the
arts
for
a
term.”
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-15-02-0354.
100. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2108 (2013)
(“Held: A naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and not patent eligible merely
because it has been isolated, but cDNA is patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring.”).
101. Id. at 2117.
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created in vitro, was “not a “product of nature” and is patent eligible under
§ 101, except insofar as very short series of DNA may have no intervening
introns to remove when creating cDNA.” “In that situation, a short strand
of cDNA may be indistinguishable from natural DNA.”102 The logic
applied by the Supreme Court in deciding Myriad surprised many because
the synthetic intermediate is designed to be a functional mirror image of the
natural product.103 The reasoning applied by the Supreme Court to reach
the decision, which was established as precedent for interpreting patent
eligible subject matter, baffles almost anyone that has been taught to think
of an invention as a ground breaking, innovative or even brilliant
discovery.
The last case in this quartet of opinions is Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int’l (2014).104 Alice is the first Supreme Court case on the patent
eligibility of software-related inventions since Diehr, and it is fraught with
a number of different issues, including extortion of practicing entities by
non-practicing entities and the patentability of inventions that have existed
for many years in the form of trade secrets. In Alice, a consortium of banks
(collectively “CLS Bank”) developed a computer system that used
proprietary technology to facilitate trillions of dollars in transactions every
102. Id. at 2119.
103. Justice Scalia deserves credit for articulating in his concurrence that he was unable to affirm
the molecular biology details of the discovery. In his words: “I join the judgment of the Court, and all of
its opinion except Part I–A and some portions of the rest of the opinion going into fine details of
molecular biology. I am unable to affirm those details on my own knowledge or even my own belief. It
suffices for me to affirm, having studied the opinions below and the expert briefs presented here, that
the portion of DNA isolated from its natural state sought to be patented is identical to that portion of the
DNA in its natural state; and that complementary DNA (cDNA) is a synthetic creation not normally
present in nature.” Id. at 2120 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Ct. Justice Thomas attempted to explain what was
not being decided in Myriad. In his words: “It is important to note what is not implicated by this
decision. First, there are no method claims before this Court. Had Myriad created an innovative method
of manipulating genes while searching for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, it could possibly have sought
a method patent. But the processes used by Myriad to isolate DNA were well understood by geneticists
at the time of Myriad’s patents “were well understood, widely used, and fairly uniform insofar as any
scientist engaged in the search for a gene would likely have utilized a similar approach,” 702
F.Supp.2d, at 202–203, and are not at issue in this case. Similarly, this case does not involve patents on
new applications of knowledge about the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. Judge Bryson aptly noted that,
“[a]s the first party with knowledge of the [BRCA1 and BRCA2] sequences, Myriad was in an excellent
position to claim applications of that knowledge. Many of its unchallenged claims are limited to such
applications.” 689 F.3d, at 1349. Nor do we consider the patentability of DNA in which the order of the
naturally occurring nucleotides has been altered. Scientific alteration of the genetic code presents a
different inquiry, and we express no opinion about the application of § 101 to such endeavors. We
merely hold that genes and the information they encode are not patent eligible under § 101 simply
because they have been isolated from the surrounding genetic material.” Id. at 2119-20.
104. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). For a detailed discussion of
Post-Alice Jurisprudence see Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Three Faces of Prometheus: A Post-Alice
Jurisprudence of Abstractions, 16 N.C.J. OF L. AND TECH. 647 (2015) (for a discussion of the current
jurisprudence on patent-eligibility).
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day.105 Alice Corporation (“Alice”), widely believed by many to be a nonpracticing entity or patent troll, owned several patents that disclosed a
scheme for mitigating “settlement risk,” i.e., that covered the proprietary
methods used by the banks to facilitate the aforementioned transactions.
Alice attempted to enforce its patents against CLS and CLS challenged the
validity the patents in court.106 The district court held that all of the claims
were ineligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because they
were directed to an abstract idea. 107 The Federal Circuit affirmed, sitting en
banc.108 The Supreme Court held that the claims were drawn to a patent
ineligible abstract idea. 109 Yet, when explaining the legal framework that
needs to be used to determine patent eligible subject matter, Justice
Thomas explained that the “Mayo framework” must be applied to:
distinguish patents that claim the buildin[g] block[s] of human ingenuity,
which are ineligible for patent protection, from those that integrate the
building blocks into something more, thereby transform[ing] them into a
patent-eligible invention.”110 Alice concludes by applying the framework of
Mayo to all judicial exceptions and all claim types.111
D. The Facts and Posture of Ariosa v. Sequenom
Alice was decided on March 20, 2014. Shortly thereafter, the USPTO
began to update their interim guidance on subject matter eligibility and to
retrain patent examiners on how to evaluate patent claims reciting natural
phenomena and abstract ideas. 112 If the courts are struggling with what
exactly is enough to render a claim that partly recites a natural law patent
105. Roger Parloff, Supreme Court to decide when ideas become too ‘abstract’ to patent, FORBES
MAGAZINE (Mar. 28, 2014, 9:00 AM EDT), http://fortune.com/2014/03/28/supreme-court-to-decidewhen-ideas-become-too-abstract-to-patent/.
106. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221, 223 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d,
685 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 484 F. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir.
2012), and aff’d, 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 189 L. Ed. 2d 296 (2014)(The
facts of the case describe Alice as an Australian company that: 1) owns four United States patents; and
2) asserts that CLS infringes these four patents).
107. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2011) rev’d, 685 F.3d
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012) reh’g en banc granted, vacated, 484 F. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012) and aff’d, 717
F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
108. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 189
L. Ed. 2d 296 (2014).
109. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2349-50, (2014).
110. Id. at 2350(internal citations omitted) (alterations in original).
111. Id. at 2349-50.
112. 2014 Interim Guidance on Subject Matter Eligibility, U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/examination-policy/2014-interim-guidance-subjectmatter-eligibility-0 (last modified Nov. 2, 2016).

130

CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Vol 16:112

eligible, so are patent examiners, patent practitioners, and investors
considering the possibility of financing the development of a discovery.
The Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility from the
USPTO to patent examiners that explains how to consider the breadth of 35
U.S.C. § 101 has been updated approximately eight times since August
2009.113 Ariosa v. Sequenom114 is a case that clearly illustrates why the
newly created judicial framework fails to protect many inventions in
biotechnology.
The patents at issue in Ariosa detail the discovery of cell-free fetal
DNA (“cffDNA”) in the maternal blood. Current estimates suggest that
between 11-13.4% of the DNA in the maternal blood is fetal in origin.115
The invention, commercialized by Sequenom as its MaterniT21 test,
created an alternative for prenatal diagnosis that avoids the risks of widelyused techniques that obtain samples from the fetus or placenta.116
Sequenom, Inc. licensed the patent117 from the inventors and began to
commercialize the technology. A dispute arose when two competitors of
Sequenom, Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. and Natera, Inc. sought a declaration
that their own test using cffDNA did not infringe on the patent licensed by
Sequenom. Sequenom counterclaimed for patent infringement. 118 At this
point the District Court determined that the Sequenom patent was invalid
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Sequenom appealed but the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court 119 and denied a rehearing in banc. 120

113. See Current Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance and Training Materials, U.S. PAT. AND
TRADEMARK
OFF.,
(http://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/examination-policy/2014interim-guidance-subject-matter-eligibility-0) (last modified July 20, 2016) (listing eligibility standards
for December 2014 with July 2015 update); Past Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance and Training
Materials,
U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF.,
(http://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-andregulations/examination-policy/past-subject-matter-eligibility-guidance-and-training) (last modified
July 29, 2016) (listing links for eligibility materials for June 2014, Mar. 2014, Aug. 2012, 2010, Aug.
2009.)
114. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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The reluctance of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 121 and of the
Federal Circuit to deny the validity of the Sequenom patent on its merits is
illuminating. In denying a petition for rehearing en banc filed by
Sequenom, Circuit Judge Lourie noted that:
I concur in the court’s denial of rehearing en banc in this case, based on the
precedent of Mayo . . . . I do so because I find no principled basis to distinguish
this case from Mayo, by which we are bound. . . . Appellants and amici have
argued before us in briefs that a broad range of claims of this sort appear to be
in serious jeopardy. It is said that the whole category of diagnostic claims is at
risk. It is also said that a crisis of patent law and medical innovation may be
upon us, and there seems to be some truth in that concern.122

Judge Lourie further elaborated that “[“[t]he claims in the [Sequenom]
case perhaps should be in jeopardy, not because they recite natural laws or
abstract ideas, but because they may be indefinite or too broad.”123 But they
should not be patent-ineligible on the ground that they set forth natural
laws or are abstractions.”124 Justice Lourie then notes that the discovery of
cffDNA “has led to an important new development: diagnosis of possible
birth defects without using highly intrusive means.”125 Citing Diehr, justice
Lourie concluded by making the statement that even though he was bound
by the Mayo precedent “[a]pplications of natural phenomena or laws to a
known process ‘may well be deserving of patent protection.’”126
In addition to Lourie other circuit justices noted their concerns with
the Mayo framework in denying rehearing of Ariosa en banc. Circuit Judge
Timothy Dyk explicitly explained the need for further guidance and why
the guidance needs to be provided directly by the Supreme Court. In his
words:
In my view the framework of Mayo and Alice is an essential ingredient of a
healthy patent system, allowing the invalidation of improperly issued and
highly anticompetitive patents without the need for protracted and expensive
litigation. Yet I share the concerns of some of my colleagues that a too
restrictive test for patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 with respect to laws
of nature (reflected in some of the language in Mayo) may discourage

121. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., No. IPR2012-00022, 2014 WL 4381564 (P.T.A.B.
Sept. 2, 2014) (The P.T.A.B. found the ′540 patent to be invalid in part, based on an anticipation
analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 102. It affirmed several dependent claims as valid).
122. Ariosa, 809 F.3d at 1284-85 (internal citation removed) (emphasis added).
123. I have interpreted “too broad” to mean that Judge Lourie agreed with the interpretation of the
PTAB in the IPR of the ′540 patent.
124. Ariosa, 809 F.3d at 1285.
125. Id. at 1285.
126. Id. at 1285-86.
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development and disclosure of new diagnostic and therapeutic methods in the
life sciences, which are often driven by discovery of new natural laws and
phenomena. This leads me to think that some further illumination as to the
scope of Mayo would be beneficial in one limited aspect. At the same time I
think that we are bound by the language of Mayo, and any further guidance
must come from the Supreme Court, not this court. 127

Only Judge Newman demonstrated any willingness to attempt to
distinguish the claims at stake in Sequenom from the claims challenged in
Mayo.128 In pointing to the white elephant in the room, Judge Newman
states that as the other judges recognized, the Sequenom discovery
represents a breakthrough, and provides important diagnostic information
without the risks of the previously required invasive procedures of
penetrating the amniotic sac.129 Judge Newman concludes by stating that: “I
respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ conclusion that Supreme Court
precedent on Section 101 excludes this invention from eligibility for
patenting. . . .The subject matter should be reviewed for compliance with
Sections 102, 103, and 112, and any other relevant provisions of the patent
law.”130
III. CONCLUSION
E. The Supreme Court should use the facts and posture of Ariosa v.
Sequenom to provide further guidance on patent eligibility and perhaps
limit the scope of judicially created exceptions to patent eligibility to select
classes of patents.
Most appellate courts understand that sometimes a legal test is too
difficult, too subtle, too ambiguous, or too ephemeral to be usefully applied
by lower courts. In patent law, the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court
are not only creating precedent that guides lower courts, but they are also
creating precedent that guides patent examiners, many of whom are trained
solely in a technical field. The subtleties of a legal analysis can be lost on
the engineers and scientists who have been trained to recognize new and
useful processes, machines, manufactures, or any improvements thereof. In
March 2016, Sequenom filed a Petition for writ of certiorari in the
127. Id. at 1287 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 1294.
129. See MaterniT® 21 PLUS, SEQUENOM, INC., https://www.sequenom.com/tests/reproductivehealth/maternit21-plus (last visited Sept. 17, 2016).
130. Ariosa, 809 F.3d at 1294.
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Supreme Court of the United States, challenging the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Ariosa.131 Considering
the complexity of the rules and the difficulties in correctly applying the
judicial exceptions across various areas of technology, it would be
appropriate for the Supreme Court to provide further guidance on patent
eligibility. The Supreme Court should grant cert, reconsider the
“overwhelming breadth and scope of [its] prior ruling in Mayo”132, and
possible consider a more effective approach for applying exceptions of
patent eligible subject matter.
The single question presented by Sequenom in the petition for
certiorari is as follows:
Whether a novel method is patent-eligible where: (1) a researcher is the first to
discover a natural phenomenon; (2) that unique knowledge motivates him to
apply a new combination of known techniques to that discovery; and (3) he
thereby achieves a previously impossible result without preempting other uses
of the discovery? 133

To address some of the points raised by this question, some have
suggested that the Supreme Court should reconsider the legal principles
applied in Chakrabarty and Diehr.134 Others believe that the Supreme
Court should consider the path proposed by Circuit Justice Pauline
Newman: the invalidity of certain claims is more appropriately pursued
under the other sections of the patent statute, namely 35 U.S.C. §§ 102,
103, or 112.135 Another approach is to consider that different areas of
technology have different views as to what constitutes a natural
phenomena. Thus, if the Supreme Court chooses to elaborate on a
definition of a “natural phenomena” it should consider narrowly applying
its guidance to only one or more technology classes in the CPC.
Adopted by the USPTO as of January 1, 2013, the CPC is a system for
organizing all U.S. patent documents into collections based on common

131. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371
(2015) (No. 15-1182).
132. Gene Quinn, SCOTUS Blog founder asks Supreme Court to reconsider Mayo ruling in
Sequenom v. Ariosa, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/03/21/scotussupreme-court-reconsider-mayo-sequenom-ariosa/id=67333/.
133. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371
(2015) (No. 15-1182).
134. Eric Guttag, The Broken Patent-Eligibility Test of Alice and Mayo: Why We Urgently Need to
Return to Principles of Diehr and Chakrabarty, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 25, 2014)
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/09/25/broken-patent-eligibility-test-of-alice-and-mayo/id=51370/.
135. See, e.g., Ariosa, at 1294 (where J. Newman explains that invalidity of the claims would have
been more appropriately pursued under the other sections of the patent statute, namely 35 U.S.C. §§
102, 103, or 112).
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subject matter and there are over 400 classes in the U.S. patent
classification system, further divided into subclasses. A class generally
delineates one technology from another. Subclasses delineate processes,
structural features, and functional features of the subject matter
encompassed within the scope of a class. Because patents in the same
patent class have similar technical features, the application of a judicial
exception to patents in the same, or in a similar class, limits the possibility
of unanticipated consequences of broadly applying exceptions based on
specific facts to inventions in different fields. For example, the two patents
challenged in the Mayo case were reviewed by examiners in the patent
technology center that specializes in biotechnology and organic chemistry
inventions. This same technology center reviewed the patent at issue in
Ariosa. In both Mayo and Ariosa, district and appellate courts relied on an
In re Bilski type of analysis to evaluate the claims regardless of the fact that
the “natural phenomena” or “laws of nature” at the core of Bilski are
remarkably different than the “natural phenomena” at the heart of Mayo
and Ariosa. In contrast, some the patents challenged in Bilski were
reviewed by a technology center that focuses on patents that are classified
as: “Computer Architecture, Software, and Information Security.” The
patents challenged in Alice were reviewed by examiners in the technology
center that reviews, among other things, electronic commerce.
Applying judicial exceptions to select classes of patents could promote
consistency across the USPTO and consistent decision-making in judging a
patent’s validity. This could also remove some of uncertainty that has been
created by the broad application of the Mayo and Alice rulings, which
outlined overly broad tests for the patent eligibility of abstract ideas and
natural products based on vastly different fact patterns and technologies.
This path could also make it easier for our appellate courts to produce
tailored tests for patent eligibility that should only be applicable in some
fields.

